Mr. Zardari is in trouble, no doubt on that. Behind the scene political maneuvering from military establishment resulted in media campaign against his person. But on the other hand he is himself responsible for much of his shortcomings. The way he handled the judicial crisis for short term gains was his biggest mistake which shattered the public trust, if there was any, on his leadership abilities. I will give him some points on Musharraf issue as it is first time in our history that a former Army chief is registered for murder and habeas corpus. But his media managers completely failed in proper communication of the historical significance of these FIRs. Someone might view this in the context of judicial activism rather than any initiative on behalf of Zardari as well.
Prima facie, the reluctance of Zardari over the annulment of 17th amendment has more to do with Nov 2010, when he will appoint new COAS. Till that time he wants to retain his position as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. The annulment of remaining clauses would not be that difficult. His comfort level with Gen Kayani has been badly deteriorated since the infamous press release of ISPR criticizing Kerry-Lugar bill. Although we can trace it back to Kayani's intervention in the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhry. The promotion of Gen Kayani as a most influential person (top 20) in western media outlets before and just after the said reinstatement can be considered as another reason. The "Time" placed him even before Barack Obama in this year's parade of most influential's. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote his intro in the same list. This of course disturbs the delicate balance, in a country like Pakistan, between Civil and Military establishment, where all previous High Treasons were supported by US military aids.
The Nov 2008 Mumbai attacks also damaged the relationship badly. Civilian government took that event as another Kargil adventure with obvious strategic purposes; to put the newly formed government in back foot with respect to its relationship with neighboring India and check any efforts to control security apparatus. Mumbai attack was dubbed as Pakistani response to attack on Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on 20th September 2008 in some security circles. Yet again something of that sort and scale was imminent after July 2008 attack on Indian embassy in Kabul. India and Afghanistan blamed that attack on ISI. Even the so called friendly Taliban blamed the attack on Indo-Pakistan rivalry in spite of their readiness to accept all sort of Headline making violence within Afghanistan. A friend of mine told me after the said attack in Kabul that according to Indian diplomatic circles, Pakistan had crossed the Rubicon. There are of course justified security concerns of Pakistan's military establishment in ever growing Indian interests in Western flank of borders. The report submitted by Lt. Gen. McChrystal, the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan and the ISAF, late September this year, appears to admit that concerns. Under the rubric of "External Influences" he had made following observations:
"Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India."
This clearly reflects his apprehensions on rising Indian involvement and the likely repercussions on curbing the militancy within Afghanistan and in the region. But hold on! We missed a very important link in the whole chain of events as they unfolded. It is the President's interview to the Wall Street Journal, published on 4th Oct 2008, which caused a stir and eyebrows to rise in GHQ. In that interview Mr. Zardari, who had taken the charge of President a month before, proclaimed that ""India has never been a threat to Pakistan". He further added that his democratic government is not scared of Indian influence abroad. That was a very ambitious statement to say the least if not wrong altogether, in the given circumstances. And within a short span of two months he was realized otherwise by the "hidden hands". Similar escapade was witnessed in Kargil in May-July 1999 when Nawaz Sharif tried to break the ice with India in Feb same year. The attack on Indian parliament in Dec 2001, when Gen (r) Musharraf tried a similar rapprochement in July of that year, conformed to the same pattern.
The government decision to send ISI chief to India after Mumbai attacks, which some Indian media tried to portrayed as being summoned, backfired too. ISPR, though it had disowned ISI in case of Najam Sethi arrest in 1999, released another statement showing ignorance of any such move.
The other reasons of misgiving may include government notification of 26th July 2008, just 20 days after the attack on Indian embassy in Kabul, to place ISI under the control of Interior Ministry. The presence of Rehman Malik, the timing of the decision and the huge stakes involved in the premier intelligence agency made it impossible for the Army to easily swallow the move. In less than 24 hrs, a verification reversed the content of earlier notification.
The final nail in the coffin was the Kerry-Lugar bill. The pure American legislation was indoctrinated as a bilateral agreement. Fabulous clauses were invented out of it to create a general disturbance and anxiety among common people. The roll of some anchors and traditional allies of the establishment like Jamat-e-Islami cannot be overemphasized. Hillary Clinton correctly advised the genuine critics of the legislation to at least read it before making comments on the same. A careful reading of the 'Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009' exposes the real motivation behind this engineered outcry against the bill. I shall discuss here all relevant clauses having any serious impact on bilateral security relations. Let's start with clause 3.2 under the heading of "Findings":
Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance and direct payments.
This clause, in general, represents the history of our financial relationship with US government. As you may observe, the major chunk of the aid in past eight years remained military oriented. This finding is tried to be addressed by Obama administration in clause 4.3 which admits that the assistance should not "disproportionately focus on security-related assistance". Moving forward we find a reference of Muridke and Quetta in clause 3.6 as following;
the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries.
Though there is no problem mentioning TTP, but pointing out Muridke and Quetta have obvious security implications for Pakistan. Besides Quetta which remains in headlines for quite a few months now because of presence of "Taliban Shura", the reference to Muridke is even more disturbing. The importance of Kashmir issue in our security calculus is evident and the role Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is playing in these calculations is apparent now for more than 20 years. But even more important question is what "official" Pakistani position is on this issue? LT was banned not by any civilian government, and they could not even imagined doing so, but by a military ruler back in January 2002 after the attack on Indian parliament. Later on they were put on Consolidated List of terrorist organization under resolution 1267 of UNSC on 2nd May 2005. The organization was listed under the category of "Entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida". This is a joke though as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba never remain affiliated with Al Qaeda and is entirely engaged in Kashmir. On 10 Dec 2008 the list was amended to include "Jamaat-ud-Dawa", a political and charity front for the same organization. This was declared a diplomatic debacle by some analysts because China did not block it though vetoed three similar moves in the past.
Coming back to Taliban, It is interesting to note that the operations of Sirajuddin Haqqani from Pakistani are in focus for a long time now. In 2006 Haqqani issued circular urging militants to continue jihad against the US and the Karzai government in Afghanistan, but opposed attacks in Pakistan. He pointed out that "fighting Pakistan does not conform to Taliban policy...those who [continue to wage] an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks." Though he later appeared to retract his support for Pakistani military in an interview to CBS but still it is largely believed that he continues to get support from Pakistan. Admiral Mike Mullen during his visit to Islamabad last year reportedly provided the Pakistani government with intercepted communications between ISI and Taliban. The US national security advisor Gen. James L. Jones said recently that the United States regarded tackling Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan as "the next step" in the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan engagement with Afghani Taliban is based upon the premises and calculations that eventually US will withdraw from Afghanistan. In that case present "Pro-Indian" regime of Karzai won't be able to take on Taliban fighters in absence of US troops. There are few alternative views also. Some analysts believe that by continuous assistance to Taliban, Pakistan will be able to force dialogue between them and US. It will result in a more inclusive Afghan government. There are some recent reports which indicated that a sort of exchange of ideas took place between Taliban and US. The talks were brokered by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Taliban confirmed informal exchanges. Other freaks say that this continuous support is a behind the scene agreement between the armies of US and Pakistan. This liaison is meant to support the Military-Industrial Complex and future strategic interests in the region, markedly in China, Iran and future energy corridors. The recent attacks in Iran evinced an area of engagement where US, Pakistan and Taliban can be seen in the same basket. But we were discussing Kerry-Lugar bill.
Dunya News - Pakistani cricket team requires at... by dunyanews
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/3269123
Prima facie, the reluctance of Zardari over the annulment of 17th amendment has more to do with Nov 2010, when he will appoint new COAS. Till that time he wants to retain his position as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. The annulment of remaining clauses would not be that difficult. His comfort level with Gen Kayani has been badly deteriorated since the infamous press release of ISPR criticizing Kerry-Lugar bill. Although we can trace it back to Kayani's intervention in the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhry. The promotion of Gen Kayani as a most influential person (top 20) in western media outlets before and just after the said reinstatement can be considered as another reason. The "Time" placed him even before Barack Obama in this year's parade of most influential's. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote his intro in the same list. This of course disturbs the delicate balance, in a country like Pakistan, between Civil and Military establishment, where all previous High Treasons were supported by US military aids.
The Nov 2008 Mumbai attacks also damaged the relationship badly. Civilian government took that event as another Kargil adventure with obvious strategic purposes; to put the newly formed government in back foot with respect to its relationship with neighboring India and check any efforts to control security apparatus. Mumbai attack was dubbed as Pakistani response to attack on Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on 20th September 2008 in some security circles. Yet again something of that sort and scale was imminent after July 2008 attack on Indian embassy in Kabul. India and Afghanistan blamed that attack on ISI. Even the so called friendly Taliban blamed the attack on Indo-Pakistan rivalry in spite of their readiness to accept all sort of Headline making violence within Afghanistan. A friend of mine told me after the said attack in Kabul that according to Indian diplomatic circles, Pakistan had crossed the Rubicon. There are of course justified security concerns of Pakistan's military establishment in ever growing Indian interests in Western flank of borders. The report submitted by Lt. Gen. McChrystal, the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan and the ISAF, late September this year, appears to admit that concerns. Under the rubric of "External Influences" he had made following observations:
"Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India."
This clearly reflects his apprehensions on rising Indian involvement and the likely repercussions on curbing the militancy within Afghanistan and in the region. But hold on! We missed a very important link in the whole chain of events as they unfolded. It is the President's interview to the Wall Street Journal, published on 4th Oct 2008, which caused a stir and eyebrows to rise in GHQ. In that interview Mr. Zardari, who had taken the charge of President a month before, proclaimed that ""India has never been a threat to Pakistan". He further added that his democratic government is not scared of Indian influence abroad. That was a very ambitious statement to say the least if not wrong altogether, in the given circumstances. And within a short span of two months he was realized otherwise by the "hidden hands". Similar escapade was witnessed in Kargil in May-July 1999 when Nawaz Sharif tried to break the ice with India in Feb same year. The attack on Indian parliament in Dec 2001, when Gen (r) Musharraf tried a similar rapprochement in July of that year, conformed to the same pattern.
The government decision to send ISI chief to India after Mumbai attacks, which some Indian media tried to portrayed as being summoned, backfired too. ISPR, though it had disowned ISI in case of Najam Sethi arrest in 1999, released another statement showing ignorance of any such move.
The other reasons of misgiving may include government notification of 26th July 2008, just 20 days after the attack on Indian embassy in Kabul, to place ISI under the control of Interior Ministry. The presence of Rehman Malik, the timing of the decision and the huge stakes involved in the premier intelligence agency made it impossible for the Army to easily swallow the move. In less than 24 hrs, a verification reversed the content of earlier notification.
The final nail in the coffin was the Kerry-Lugar bill. The pure American legislation was indoctrinated as a bilateral agreement. Fabulous clauses were invented out of it to create a general disturbance and anxiety among common people. The roll of some anchors and traditional allies of the establishment like Jamat-e-Islami cannot be overemphasized. Hillary Clinton correctly advised the genuine critics of the legislation to at least read it before making comments on the same. A careful reading of the 'Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009' exposes the real motivation behind this engineered outcry against the bill. I shall discuss here all relevant clauses having any serious impact on bilateral security relations. Let's start with clause 3.2 under the heading of "Findings":
Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance and direct payments.
This clause, in general, represents the history of our financial relationship with US government. As you may observe, the major chunk of the aid in past eight years remained military oriented. This finding is tried to be addressed by Obama administration in clause 4.3 which admits that the assistance should not "disproportionately focus on security-related assistance". Moving forward we find a reference of Muridke and Quetta in clause 3.6 as following;
the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries.
Though there is no problem mentioning TTP, but pointing out Muridke and Quetta have obvious security implications for Pakistan. Besides Quetta which remains in headlines for quite a few months now because of presence of "Taliban Shura", the reference to Muridke is even more disturbing. The importance of Kashmir issue in our security calculus is evident and the role Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is playing in these calculations is apparent now for more than 20 years. But even more important question is what "official" Pakistani position is on this issue? LT was banned not by any civilian government, and they could not even imagined doing so, but by a military ruler back in January 2002 after the attack on Indian parliament. Later on they were put on Consolidated List of terrorist organization under resolution 1267 of UNSC on 2nd May 2005. The organization was listed under the category of "Entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida". This is a joke though as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba never remain affiliated with Al Qaeda and is entirely engaged in Kashmir. On 10 Dec 2008 the list was amended to include "Jamaat-ud-Dawa", a political and charity front for the same organization. This was declared a diplomatic debacle by some analysts because China did not block it though vetoed three similar moves in the past.
Coming back to Taliban, It is interesting to note that the operations of Sirajuddin Haqqani from Pakistani are in focus for a long time now. In 2006 Haqqani issued circular urging militants to continue jihad against the US and the Karzai government in Afghanistan, but opposed attacks in Pakistan. He pointed out that "fighting Pakistan does not conform to Taliban policy...those who [continue to wage] an undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends nor shall we allow them in our ranks." Though he later appeared to retract his support for Pakistani military in an interview to CBS but still it is largely believed that he continues to get support from Pakistan. Admiral Mike Mullen during his visit to Islamabad last year reportedly provided the Pakistani government with intercepted communications between ISI and Taliban. The US national security advisor Gen. James L. Jones said recently that the United States regarded tackling Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan as "the next step" in the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan engagement with Afghani Taliban is based upon the premises and calculations that eventually US will withdraw from Afghanistan. In that case present "Pro-Indian" regime of Karzai won't be able to take on Taliban fighters in absence of US troops. There are few alternative views also. Some analysts believe that by continuous assistance to Taliban, Pakistan will be able to force dialogue between them and US. It will result in a more inclusive Afghan government. There are some recent reports which indicated that a sort of exchange of ideas took place between Taliban and US. The talks were brokered by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Taliban confirmed informal exchanges. Other freaks say that this continuous support is a behind the scene agreement between the armies of US and Pakistan. This liaison is meant to support the Military-Industrial Complex and future strategic interests in the region, markedly in China, Iran and future energy corridors. The recent attacks in Iran evinced an area of engagement where US, Pakistan and Taliban can be seen in the same basket. But we were discussing Kerry-Lugar bill.
Dunya News - Pakistani cricket team requires at... by dunyanews
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/3269123
